In the past decade, it has become common to use simple laboratory games and decision tasks as a device for measuring risk preferences in the developing world. In this paper, we build on existing taxonomies for risk elicitation and discuss pros and cons of using such methods in developing-country contexts. We use three distinct risk-elicitation mechanisms (the Holt-Laury task, the Gneezy-Potters mechanism, and a non-incentivized willingness-to-risk scale) and subjects from rural Senegal. Our study provides some guidance to researchers wishing to use risk-elicitation mechanisms in the rural developing world.
INTRODUCTION
In the developing world, welfare evaluation of any proposed policy with risky outcomes should take into account risk preferences (e.g, Harrison, 2011) . Suppose a non-governmental organization implements a pilot-seed-variety program. Researchers are often requested to evaluate the impact of such a program, by for example designing a randomized controlled trial (RCT). It is common to wonder how the impact of this RCT varies with farmers' risk preferences. To answer this question, researchers turn to risk-preference data. If these are imprecise or biased, incorrect inferences and ineffective policies can emerge.
It has become common in recent years for researchers in development economics to utilize tools developed by experimental economists, in order to measure important traits, attitudes, and characteristics of the poor in rural settings in the developing world. Some examples include Ashraf (2009) , Attanasio et al. (2011); Carter (2011), Delavande et al. (2011) , Giné et al. (2010) , Harrison et al. (2010) , and . 1 The risk attitude of the population is one characteristic with clear importance for policy recommendations.
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Many techniques, ranging from simple to complex, have evolved for testing risk preferences. Our aim in this paper is to illustrate how three rather different mechanisms play out in rural Senegal. While we do not claim that this environment is fully representative of the developing world, we nevertheless build on existing taxonomies of risk-elicitation instruments and feel that we provide useful insights concerning the potential pros and cons of these mechanisms and their effectiveness, as well as document in detail some procedural issues.
In this study, we implement three elicitation devices in rural Senegal, including two choice-based mechanisms and a non-incentivized survey question. One device is the well-known method used in Holt and Laury (2002) , where people make a series of 10 choices between two systematically varied alternatives. A second device is an adaptation of a method used by Gneezy and Potters (1997) , where there is a simple choice of how much to invest in a risky asset with a positive expected profit from investing. The third mechanism we use is a nonincentivized survey question taken from Dohmen et al. (2011) , which asks the respondent to report her willingness to take risk on a scale of ten.
A summary of our main results: (1) There is considerable inconsistency in the choices made by individuals responding to the Holt-Laury (HL) questionnaire. (2) The results with the Gneezy-Potters (GP) approach show only modest differences from previous work. (3) Many women state they would take on the very highest degree of risk on the willingness-to-take risk (WTR) question. This is very different from results in most previous studies, but seems to match the environment in which these women live.
To our knowledge, few (if any) studies compare three different risk-elicitation instruments in the field (and possibly not even in the lab). It is this literature at the intersection of experimental and development economics that we seek to complement with our study. We provide interesting results, assess differences across the mechanisms, and provide detail regarding the issues involved in working in developing countries. Development economists wishing to gather data on risk preferences should find this useful; furthermore, the spirit of our methodological results may also apply to the elicitation of other preferences in this environment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we propose a taxonomy for risk-elicitation instruments and describe the results from previous studies using our elicitation methods. Section 3 describes the implementation and contains the experimental and survey results. We conclude in Section 4.
TAXONOMY OF ELICITATION METHODS AND EXISTING EVIDENCE
There have been many experimental studies on risk preferences, as this is one of the building blocks of economic theory and analysis. For reviews of previous work, we refer the interested reader to Offerman et al. (2009) , Dave et al. (2010) , and Crosetto and Filippin (2013) . Charness, Gneezy, and Imas (2013) provide an in-depth discussion of the general issues involved with eliciting risk preferences. In this section, we provide a taxonomy of different methods, discuss some existing evidence, and use this to motivate the choice of instruments in the next section.
When discussing existing evidence, we primarily focus on the main articles that use the elicitation methods that we implement.
Taxonomy of Risk-Elicitation Methods
One approach to classifying risk-elicitation approaches is to categorize them according to whether or not the instrument is (1) incentivized and (2) complex. Incentivized instruments associate choices with salient rewards, in contrast to non-incentivized instruments such as survey-based risk questions. Complex instruments are based on multiple price lists (MPL's, a series of choices between lotteries with varying probabilities or payoffs) or multiple risk questions; simple instruments have only one choice or response, with fixed probability where applicable. While other criteria could be used to organize risk-elicitation instruments, we choose incentives and complexity since they are relatively general and still provide structure.
Based on these criteria, Table 1 shows four broad categories of instruments with related sample studies: (1) incentivized-complex, (2) incentivized-simple, (3) non-incentivized-complex, and (4) non-incentivized-simple.
[ Table 1 about here]
Each of these categories has advantages and disadvantages. While incentivized studies elicit incentive-compatible responses, researchers must carry substantial rewards into the field.
This can be risky and time-consuming. Also, incentivized instruments are typically based on more abstract lottery choices rather than survey-based WTR questions (framed in day-to-day or general contexts). So incentivized questions can potentially cause more confusion than simple survey-based questions. Similarly, while complex instruments have the advantage of eliciting multiple responses, they take more time to explain and may present cognitive difficulties.
Furthermore, it is difficult to deal with inconsistent subjects with complex instruments. So, it is unclear that any given method is superior to another; one might wish to employ a combination of methods.
3 Table 2 presents a list of studies conducted in developing countries.
[ Table 2 ]
In this study, we implement three elicitation devices with villagers in rural Senegal. The instruments were chosen to represent (1) incentivized-complex, (2) incentivized-simple; and (3) non-incentivized simple. We did not employ a measure that represents non-incentivizedcomplex (NIC), since this study was designed to collect qualitative data on how subjects perceive "risk" in order to be able to formulate questions along the lines of domain-specific risk tasks (a prime example of NIC). The Holt-Laury task was chosen as a mainstay of risk elicitation. The Gneezy-Potters task, also widely used, was chosen for its incentivized simplicity. Finally, the WTR scale was chosen for its pure simplicity. Furthermore, were it to
give fruitful results, this task could be extremely useful, since researchers (typically pressed for time and resources) prefer to use a task that is simplest to explain.
Holt-Laury
Holt and Laury (2002) have participants make 10 choices of either option A or option B, one for each row. Table 3 shows the choices participants faced in the low-payoff treatment.
They also conducted treatments in which the payoffs are 20, 50, or 90 times the ones shown, as well as one with hypothetical payoffs. Higher payoffs lead to fewer risky choices, while hypothetical payoffs lead to more risky choices.
[ Table 3 Table A1 in the online Appendix for more detail.
Gneezy-Potters
Gneezy and Potters (1997) use a simple investment task, which is modified in Charness and Gneezy (2010 This approach differs from the others in at least two important ways: (1) there are no financial incentives provided, and (2) this question is not specific to financial risk-taking. As there are many forms of risk-taking (e.g., physical, financial, and emotional), this question may pick up traits orthogonal to the issue of concern; however, they do find that this measure matches up well with the results from five additional questions on risk-taking in different specific contexts and an experimental validation. Still, a large amount of research in psychology suggests serious differences in risk attitudes across domains. 6 Their Figure 1 shows a good spread of risk attitudes, with a strong peak at five (the average value in the range).
To our knowledge, only a few studies employ multiple risk-elicitation methods using the same sample in a developing country context. 7 Ihli et al. (2013) 
NEW EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE Implementation
Our experiments were conducted in rural Senegal (in the regions of Thies and Diourbel) in December 2010. Since the experiments were conducted as part of a larger project on linking farmers to markets, we had access to a sample of farmer groups that are part of the federation of non-governmental organizations of Senegal (FONGS), which represents such groups at the national level. The participants were recruited through village-level farmer groups. While these participants do not represent the entire developing world, they do have several characteristics in 7 Our study is related to that of Dave et al. (2010) , who compare (with Canadian subjects) a relatively-complex elicitation method to a coarser-but-simpler elicitation method. They find: "The simpler task may be preferred for subjects who exhibit low numeracy ... For subjects with higher numerical skills, the greater predictive accuracy of the more complex task more than outweighs the larger noise." common with other populations in similar settings. For example, our subjects have relatively low (high) education (poverty) levels and depend substantially on agriculture-related activities for their survival. Furthermore, subjects are often recruited through NGOs or microfinance organizations.
We conducted four sessions in two days in December, around the agricultural commercialization season. While farmers tend to be richer during this period, our main comparisons are across instruments. We are unaware of major events that may have shaped risk attitudes around this period (see Callen et al. 2014 and Cameron and Shah, forthcoming) .
Timeline: On one day, two sessions-one Holt-Laury and one Gneezy-Potters-were held in a village in Diourbel. Each session was conducted with members of distinct farmer groups (between subjects). On the next day, two identical (between-subject) sessions were held in a village in Thies. In all sessions, we elicited the WTR question as part of a pre-survey, with the option to revise the response after the other task was completed. A typical session lasted between 2.5 and 3.0 hours. 8 The average payoffs were about twice the average daily wage for a comparable sample of households. There were 45 participants in the HL sessions and 46 participants in the GP sessions. Since all responded to the WTR question, these data comprised 91 observations.
We provide very detailed information about the implementation process in the Appendix, which may be a useful reference for researchers. Three main aspects of our experiment protocol are noteworthy.
(1) The experiments were conducted by a main experimenter in English and 8 Given the length of time of these sessions, one might be concerned that data were contaminated by discussions between people. But this was not the case; in fact, there was little or no free time during a session. A substantial amount of time was involved in making sure that people understood at the individual level. Additional time was required for the pre-and post-surveys, seating, introduction, and payment. Finally, subjects were separated by dividers.
translated on the spot and line by line into Wolof (the main national language). 9 (2) We framed the HL and GP experiments in terms of "seeds" and "yields", since most subjects in rural areas can relate to concepts of risk in agricultural terms. 10 (3) For the WTR question, we described risk as a situation that could sometimes lead to a good event (high payoff/gain) or a bad event (low payoff/loss). Specifically, we asked: "On a scale of 0-10, with 0 being the least willing and 10 being the most willing, how willing are you to take risks." However, we note that "risk" is not a well-defined term in Wolof (so that we described outcomes), and so translations are inevitably imperfect. This points to a potential difficulty in using non-choice mechanisms in the developing world. Note that in all cases, we also asked subjects to report what risk means to them in their everyday environment, in terms of output risk, crop risk, price risk, and credit risk.
In our version of HL, a non-risky seed gave a payoff of FCFA 1,000 (800) in rainy (dry) weather, while a risky seed gave a payoff of FCFA 2,000 (100) in rainy (dry) weather. The probabilities were systematically varied and described as years of good and bad weather. While this framing arguably may have altered subjects' responses, it was adopted to maximize their understanding of probabilities and relate this concept to an issue with which they are familiar in the day-to-day environment. 11 A screenshot is shown in Figure A1 in the online appendix.
In our adapted GP task, non-risky seeds pay FCFA 100 per kilo regardless of the weather.
Risky seeds paid FCFA 300 per kilo if the weather was good (rainy) and nothing if the weather was bad (dry). So, one receives 1,000 units if one purchases only non-risky seeds and corresponding amounts for purchases of other numbers of risky seeds in the event of either rainy or dry weather (each 50 percent likely). We framed the decision in terms of how many "risky seeds" one wished to purchase. A screenshot is shown in Figure A2 in the online Appendix.
Holt-Laury: New Evidence
Figure 1 shows our data and also includes the original Holt-Laury 20x real-payoff data (all highstake patterns are similar) for comparison. The horizontal axis displays the decision (1 through 10) and the vertical axis displays the probability of option A being chosen (across all respondents). The median number of safe choices is 5.0.
[ Figure 1 here]
The Senegal curve shows relative insensitivity to changes in probability (and is not even monotonic 1. Respondents who first chose option A and switched once to option B. We see these subjects as truly understanding and consider them consistent. 2. Respondents who always chose option B. While these subjects are consistent, in principle we cannot rule out the possibility that they misunderstood. 3. Respondents who always chose option A. While these subjects are consistent, we suspect they did not understand, since one should always prefer option B in decision 10. So, we classify them as "inconsistent" in subsequent analysis. 4. Respondents who switch at least twice.
Under this classification scheme, 24.4 percent of participants appear to have possibly understood the task (type 1 or type 2), while another 24.4 participants always chose A (type 3).
Finally, 51.1 percent of the participants switched columns at least twice. There is also a reasonable inference that people of type 2 (11.1 percent) did not really understand the task, since only extreme risk-seekers should choose option B in the first row. Since it is unclear that type 2 individuals really understood the task and only 11.1 percent were type 1, somewhere between 11.1 and 48.9 percent of participants understood the task. In line with the Filippin and Crosetto (2014) meta-study of HL results, men make only insignificantly fewer safe choices (p = 0.394, one-tailed test). We find that women are less consistent in their choices (p = 0.030, two-tailed test).
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Overall, our impression is that our formulation of the HL task was not well understood by the participants. While there may be better ways of presenting this task to people in this type of rural environment, it seems that using a relatively sophisticated mechanism is not effective here.
Furthermore, this seems to be supported by some of the findings in Table 3 .
Gneezy-Potters: New Evidence
Panel A of Figure 2 shows the distribution of risky seeds chosen in our Gneezy-Potters adaptation. The average number of risky seeds chosen in Senegal is 4.78 (of 10). On average male subjects chose 5.72 seeds, while female subjects chose 4.18 seeds, consistent with prior Gneezy-Potters results. However, we are reluctant to draw strong conclusions, as there may well be important differences across subject pools. There is a big spike at five risky seeds, as nearly one-third (15 of 46) purchased this number of seeds.
[ Figure 2 about here] While there are multiple differences across the populations, ruling out strong inferences, we nevertheless can make some comparisons to the data from two studies involving non-students Villeval 2009 and Haigh and List 2005) . There is no significant difference from our data for either study, although the proportion of the highest risk choices in Charness and 12 Overall, in inconsistency in the HL task seems to be driven by people who choose the safe lottery more often and by women, even after controlling for cognitive measures such as education and the ability to calculate 15% of 2000.
Villeval (2009) is greater in Panel B. 13 The difference between male and female investment rates is significant (p = 0.034, one-tailed t-test). Figure 3 shows the distribution of subjects' levels of willingness to take risk on a scale of 1 to 10. 14 Dohmen et al. (2011) argue that such a measure generates the best all-around predictor of risky behavior. There is a strong peak at 10 in our data (28.1 percent of the observations). This is dramatically different than the 1.0 percent in the Dohmen et al. data. In fact, women were 50 percent more likely to choose 10 than were men (32.7 percent versus 21.6 percent), although this difference is not statistically significant. Still, this pattern differs from findings in both psychology and economics that women are financially more risk averse (see Gneezy, 2012 and Croson and Gneezy, 2009 ) in settings around the world. 15 However, once again, the populations are very different, so one must be cautious about interpretations. Women are more willing to take risks than men in our WTR data (p = 0.070, two-tailed t-test).
Non-incentivized survey: New Evidence
[ Figure 3 about here]
DISCUSSION
We complement existing evidence by testing three different risk-preference elicitation mechanisms in rural Senegal. Our primary interest is pragmatic: What should a researcher do to elicit risk preferences in a developing nation? If one is interested in policy implementation in 13 To create Panel B, we placed the Charness and Villeval (2009) results into our bins (e.g., an investment of less than 10 of 100 tokens went to the left-most bin and an investment of over 90 tokens went to the right-most bin. 14 We report the first WTR responses. There is little difference between the first and second WTR measures, as only nine of 89 people (10 percent changed their report). This suggests that there is little in the way of order effects. Two subjects were undecided between two of the integers, so we drop them from the analysis. 15 However, Crosetto and Fillipin (2013) find that gender risk-preference differences appear only when the task is more likely to trigger loss aversion; Filippin and Crosetto (2014) find that these differences are smaller with the Holt-Laury task.
developing nations and knowledge of risk preferences is useful, it is vital to implement a mechanism that induces meaningful responses. With the Holt-Laury mechanism, most respondents make inconsistent or dominated choices. Differing levels of comprehension may correlate with differences in preferences, making policy recommendations precarious. So comprehension is a serious issue, as there seems to be no good way to account for inconsistency without excluding a large portion of the data.
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Thus, caution might be advisable concerning using a relatively sophisticated mechanism in a rural, developing-country environment.
Simply asking people about how prepared they are to take risks has low cost and easy implementation. However, here it delivers results that differ from most work on risk-preference elicitation, as there are far more choices of full risk tolerance for women in our data than in the German survey data. Indeed, a serious question is whether this is a meaningful result. In fact, it 16 We do not wish to take a stand regarding which measure is "better". Nevertheless, the regressions in Tables A3-A5 suggest that WTR is the best for prediction purposes. Bear in mind that in order to frame WTR properly, one needs to conduct a qualitative study/pilot in order to detect how people perceive "risk", which we did on a small scale. We did not vary framed versus unframed here, but from pilot work in Senegal (e.g., Aflagah, Bernard, and Viceisza, 2015) , we know that this can matter. 17 Hirschauer et al. (2014) demonstrate that including inconsistent subjects in a HL analysis "will bias the mean as well as the variance of the risk attitudes".
is the women who handle the business end of matters in this environment and are more likely to engage in microfinance etc. and are thus more likely to take/face such risks. Tables A3-A5 Finally, the adapted Gneezy-Potters task, involving equally likely alternatives and a fixed rate of return, led to results not dramatically different from those of previous work in developed and developing nations. However, it is impossible to detect confusion with this mechanism, and the choice pattern and the strong spike at 50 percent are consistent with arbitrary-choice behavior (although this 50-percent result does not hold when considering the choices of men and women separately). It could also be that choices are quite different with slight changes in the instructions, so that we see these results as indicative rather than conclusive.
Our study is an early attempt to gather data on the important methodological question of the effectiveness of different sorts of risk-elicitation mechanisms in developing nations. It is obvious that further research is needed. Nevertheless, our results provide some guidance to researchers in this area. Specifically, some possible rules-of-thumb when choosing riskelicitation instruments are: a. Conduct pilot studies. b. Employ multiple risk-elicitation instruments. c. When using complex instruments, consider the framing of one's instrument, particularly in relation to probabilities and visualization. d. Prior to designing one's instruments, conduct a careful qualitative study aimed at understanding how one's subjects perceive "risk" and what "risk-taking" means in the day-to-day context.
APPENDIX: IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS Outline
The typical session comprised: 1) Survey 1 2) An introduction of the experimenter, translator, assistant(s), IFPRI, and the project 3) Instructions on the game (more below) 4) The game (sessions 1 and 3 were HL and sessions 2 and 4 were GP) 5) An opportunity to revise certain responses to survey 1 6) The lottery a. For HL, this comprised three draws: i. The first draw was to determine the row for which the subjects would get paid. In other words, this determined the distribution of the weather. ii. The second draw was to determine whether those who chose indifference would be treated as "magasin/storage A" or "magasin/storage B". iii. The third draw was to determine the weather, that is, whether it was good or bad. b. For GP, this comprised one draw that determined the weather. 7) Survey 2 (demographic survey) 8) Payment
Layout
1) The experiments were conducted in classrooms in the local schools. Boxes were used as dividers to give privacy. 2) The typical layout of the room was as follows:
FRONT OF ROOM (experimenter, translator, and white board) a. On the following scale of 1 to 10, please indicate how willing you are to take risks. b. In your day-to-day life, what do you consider to be a risky decision? Please describe using one or more examples. c. How much is 15% of 2,000 FCFA? If you don't know, put an X.
Introduction
1) The experimenter introduced himself, the translator and the two assistants. Typically, the main assistant experimenter was not introduced till the end. 2) The experimenter introduced IFPRI and the larger project, typically as follows: a. IFPRI is an institute in the United States. b. We are conducting a research project on farmer groups, their activities and so on. c. We have been holding discussions with farmers across many parts of Senegal. In particular, we have talked to farmers in Diourbel/Thies, but we have not been here before. d. For the upcoming task, we will pay you for the decisions that you make. We pay you for two purposes: i. Because you came here today and are spending your time with us. This is time in which you could be doing something else, so we pay you for that reason. ii. Also, we would like you to take this decision seriously, as you do any other decision in real life.
Instructions and Game 1) Game 1 (HL) a. The experimenter handed out the sheet of paper for the HL game. b. The experimenter first asked subjects what they thought the pictures on the form represented. i. This served as an icebreaker. It basically enabled subjects to start thinking about the material and the decisions they would be presented with during the session. ii. In some cases the storage was seen as a school and the good weather was perceived as clouds, but typically subjects soon realized that the task would have something to do with storage and good/bad weather. c. After this mini brainstorming, the experimenter explained the following steps:
i. The brainstorming has shown that the task today has to do with storage and the weather. ii. Specifically, suppose there are two types of storage rooms (A/Abdu and B/Bara) that contain two different types of fertilizer/angrais (A/Abdu and B/Bara). We are going to ask you which of these two fertilizers you prefer. iii. How are these two fertilizers different? Let's focus on the first row of the first page. 1. Fertilizer A in magasin Abdu a. The fertilizer in magasin Abdu gives FCFA 1,000 as income from production in times of bad weather and FCFA 800 in times of good weather. i. Explain payoff and how it is associated with good/bad weather. ii. Quiz people on how much the payoff is in times of good/bad weather.
Fertilizer B in magasin Bara
ii. Now, what happens if we go from row 2 to row 3? Now, weather can be good 3 out of 10 years and bad 7 out of 10 years. iii. This process was continued up to row 10.
1. At this stage, subjects typically smiled indicating their understanding that in row 10 the weather was always good. e. So, we are going to ask you to make a decision for each of the rows: Abdu or Bara. If you do not know which one to choose, you can choose I for "indifferent." f. Is this clear?
i. At this point, a row was selected to quiz subjects again. Questions were asked with regard to the probabilities and earnings. ii. Then, subjects were informed that only one row would be selected for payment. The exact procedures for selecting the row and drawing/simulating the weather were typically explained when the lottery was drawn in order to avoid too much information prior to decisions being made. iii. Then, decisions were made. 2) Game 2 (GP) a. The game sheets (appendix) were handed out. Subjects were prompted on the images at the top as an icebreaker exercise. In both sessions they recognized them correctly as the two types of weather. b. The experimenter asked the subjects to imagine that they are grain farmers and they are to be given 10 kilos of seeds to plant for the new season. They are told that they can take two types of seeds-from Abdu or from Bara. At this point the experimenter emphasized that they must take a total of 10. He did this by giving them examples of the possible combinations of the seeds that they could take. On your answer sheet you will see a place for you to write how many Abdu seeds and Bara seeds you will take. c. Next the experimenter explained how the seeds are different. Abdu seed is of higher quality than Bara seed but is more vulnerable to the weather. That is, when there is good weather the Abdu seed produces a harvest that sells for FCFA 300. When the weather is bad the harvest is so bad that it cannot be sold, eaten, or fed to the animals. On the other hand, the Bara seed does not respond to the weather and always gives FCFA 100 francs per kilo. d. Next the experimenter proceeded to go through the columns for the Abdu seed and explain how different quantities of Abdu seed affect one's income from the harvest given good weather. What was emphasized through examples was that 300 times the number of kilos of the seeds determines the income, which is then provided for the subjects in the column 'xalis…. Abdu' on the side with good weather. This was done to the point where the experimenter felt comfortable with their understanding of the derivation of their income. Next the experimenter explained the bad weather columns for the Abdu seed, which was provided in the column 'xalis … Abdu on' the side with bad weather. This was always zero. Again examples were given until the experimenter felt comfortable with their understanding. e. The same procedure followed for the Bara seed: first with the good weather 'xalis… Bara' column and then with the bad weather 'xalis…Bara' column. It was emphasized that there was no difference between the columns. f. The experimenter explained the total income for any given type of weather-by adding the columns of 'xalis… Abdu' and 'xalis… Bara'. It was explained that this number was indicated in the column 'li ngay … xalis'. g. The experimenter asked subjects specific questions such as:
i. If the weather is good and one had 5 kilos of bara seeds how many Abdu seeds does one have? How much money does one make from these Bara seeds? … from these Abdu seeds? In total? Then he repeated for other combinations… (1 and 9, 3 and 7… etc. -each time varying the weather) ii. Whenever one subject seemed to dominate by answering correctly in succession, the experimenter asked the translator to explain to him that we would like to hear from other people as well. These examples were repeated until the experimenter felt confident about the understanding of the subjects. h. The experimenter explained how weather was unknown at the time of the decision, how this was realistic, and how it was to be determined, from a box, with equal probability of the two types of weather. That is, the weather was to be determined from a box where drawing cards with numbers 1-5 would correspond to good weather, while drawing numbers 6-10 would correspond to bad weather. These numbers were the same as the ones used for the HL task. i. Decisions were then made.
Lottery
The lotteries were conducted according to the procedures described previously. Typically, we let one of the subjects draw. Papers with numbers 1 through 10 were drawn from a bag.
Survey 2 (demographics)
1) This survey was administered after the main task and comprised the following questions: a. Education level b. Marital status c. Number of children d. Primary occupation e. How often do you find yourself short of cash? f. How much do you agree with the statement "Most people can be trusted"? (1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Slightly Disagree, 4=Neither Agree or Disagree, 5=Slightly Agree, 6=Agree, 7=Strongly Agree) g. How many cigarettes do you smoke per day? h. On a scale of 1 to 10, how patient do you consider yourself?
Payment
After all these steps were done, subjects were called by their seat number-one by one-to get paid in private by the assistant experimenter. They were also paid a fixed fee for showing up. (2002) Treibich (2015) *Indicates an instrument for which this study collects new data. **Note that to our knowledge Tanaka et al. (2010) is the only study that uses prospect theory and finds: "People living in poor countries are not necessarily afraid of uncertainty." This rate is based on the number of people who choose the dominated lottery at least twice. If we consider those who choose the dominated lottery at least once, the rate would be 76%.
TABLES AND FIGURES

*
The format of the experiment is similar to HL, but with several key differences. HL keep payoffs constant and vary the probabilities of receiving the high and low outcomes. In JP, the probability is always 50-50, and the payoffs are varied. Also, HL present the lotteries all at once to the subjects. JP present lottery pairs sequentially. Finally, JP also present lotteries over losses.
** Their decomposition resembles the instrument in HL. Each row in the decomposition corresponds to a single binary choice between two alternative gambles. Beginning with the first row of choices and moving down, an expected utility maximizer will at some point switch from the left-hand side gamble with lower variance to the right-hand side gamble with a higher variance and slightly higher expected utility. This rate is based on the number of people who choose the dominated lottery at least twice. If we consider those who choose the dominated lottery at least once, the rate would be 76%.
The format of the experiment is similar to HL, but with several key differences. HL keep payoffs constant and vary the probabilities of receiving the high and low outcomes. In JP, the probability is always 50-50, and the payoffs are varied. Also, HL present the lotteries all at once to the subjects. JP present lottery pairs sequentially. Finally, JP also present lotteries over losses. ** Their decomposition resembles the instrument in HL. Each row in the decomposition corresponds to a single binary choice between two alternative gambles. Beginning with the first row of choices and moving down, an expected utility 30aximize will at some point switch from the left-hand side gamble with lower variance to the right-hand side gamble with a higher variance and slightly higher expected utility. *** Their main instrument presents subjects with a multiple price list, but with varying payoffs as opposed to varying probabilities similar to HL. Definition of dependent variables: After explaining what risk is, we asked respondents to report if they knew of any situations or decisions they usually encounter/take that can be seen as risky. We then coded the dummies risk_output, risk_crop, risk_price, and risk_credit based on similar keywords. In all cases, 1=yes if the respondent took risk in that dimension.
Definition of independent variables: RA=number of times a respondent chose the safe lottery; HL consistency=1 if the respondent was consistent in the HL task (0 otherwise); WTR=willingness to take risk on a scale of 1 to 10; Gender=1 if the respondent is female (0 otherwise). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Session dummies included in all specifications. All variables as defined in Table A3 , except for GP=number of risky seeds chosen in the GP task. 
